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NOTE
WHEN STANDARDS COLLIDE: HOW THE
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY FAILS THE
SUPREME COURT’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT
“EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY” TEST
WHEN APPLIED TO PUERTO RICAN
FEDERAL CAPITAL DEFENDANTS
Cristina M. Quin˜ones-Betancourt*
Although the Constitution of Puerto Rico expressly prohibits the
death penalty, the U.S. federal government continues to try to impose the
punishment against defendants in Puerto Rico convicted of federal capi-
tal crimes.  This Note explores the constitutionality of the federal death
penalty, as applied to Puerto Rican defendants, in light of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” and the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment “evolving standards of decency”
test.
This Note focuses on several key factors to argue that the federal
death penalty fails the Court’s evolving standards of decency test and is,
therefore, unconstitutional when applied against defendants in Puerto
Rico.  First, this Note observes that no court in the continental United
States has ever used “objective indicia” gathered from Puerto Rican re-
sidents when determining the constitutionality of imposing the federal
death penalty against defendants in Puerto Rico.  Second, this Note ex-
amines Puerto Rico’s unique political and cultural history to underscore
the fact that Puerto Rico is so unlike any of the American states that
objective indicia gathered from those states cannot be used to determine
whether a national consensus opposes the imposition of the federal death
penalty against capital defendants in Puerto Rico.  Third, this Note em-
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phasizes the fact that the Puerto Rican consensus remains opposed to the
application of the death penalty against Puerto Rican defendants.  By
analyzing these key factors within the framework of the Supreme Court’s
evolving standards of decency test, this Note concludes that either the
imposition of the federal death penalty against Puerto Rican defendants
fails the evolving standards of decency test or the evolving standards of
decency test itself is invalid and unworkable.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2012, Edison Burgos Montes, a Puerto Rico resident, was
convicted of killing his ex-girlfriend, Madelyn Semidey Morales.1  Bur-
gos Montes killed Morales after discovering that she was a U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) informant and had been providing
the DEA with information regarding his involvement in narcotics traf-
1 Danica Coto, Puerto Rico Jury Rejects Death Penalty, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120927/cb-puerto-rico-informant-slain.
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ficking.2  Although the Constitution of Puerto Rico explicitly prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty,3 Burgos Montes became eligible for
the federal death penalty because he committed a federal capital offense
under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA):4 intentionally kill-
ing a witness to impede the investigation or prosecution of an offense
committed as part of a “continuing criminal enterprise.”5
The constitutionality of imposing the federal death penalty in Puerto
Rico has been hotly debated since Congress first passed the FDPA.6
Much of this debate centers around the fact that Puerto Rico is an unin-
corporated territory—Congress never intended for it to become a state,
thus only the most fundamental parts of the U.S. Constitution apply to its
residents.7  Consequently, although the 3.7 million Puerto Ricans living
on the island8 have United States citizenship9 and fundamental constitu-
tional rights, such as due process,10 they lack some of the most basic
rights available to American citizens living in the states.11  One of the
most important rights Puerto Rico residents lack is the right to vote in the
presidential elections.12  In addition, Puerto Rico is not represented by a
voting member of Congress but rather by a resident commissioner who
lacks congressional voting power.13  Yet, although Puerto Rico has no
voice in the U.S. federal lawmaking process, many federal laws still ap-
ply to its residents, including the highly controversial FDPA.14
2 Id.
3 P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7.
4 Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 60001–60026, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3591–3598 (2006) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
5 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(2) (2006).
6 See, e.g., Ricardo Alfonso, The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Puerto Rico: A
Human Rights Crisis in the Path Towards Self-Determination, 76 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1077
(2007); Monique Marie Gallien, Note, “No Existira la Pena de Muerte”: Does the United
States Violate Regional Customary Law by Imposing the Death Penalty on Citizens of Puerto
Rico?, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 727 (2005); Elizabeth Vicens, Application of the Federal Death
Penalty Act to Puerto Rico: A New Test for the Locally Inapplicable Standard, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 350 (2005).
7 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922).
8 Population; Total in Puerto Rico, TRADING ECON., http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
puerto-rico/population-total-wb-data.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).
9 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2006).
10 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13.
11 See id.  Throughout this Note, the term “states” refers to the individual American
states.
12 Iguartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that Puerto
Rico residents have no right under Article II of the U.S. Constitution to vote in presidential
elections because the President is selected by electors chosen by each state).
13 See 48 U.S.C. § 891 (2006).  For a more detailed history of the Resident Commis-
sioner position, see William R. Tansill, The Resident Commissioner to the United States from
Puerto Rico: An Historical Perspective, 47 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 68 (1978).
14 Interestingly, Congress has not made all federal laws applicable in Puerto Rico.  For
example, Puerto Rico residents are exempt from paying federal taxes.  48 U.S.C. § 734 (2006).
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The majority of Puerto Rico’s residents remain opposed to the ap-
plication of the federal death penalty against Puerto Rican defendants on
moral, historical, and cultural grounds.15  Moreover, because the Consti-
tution of Puerto Rico specifically states that the “death penalty shall not
exist,”16 Puerto Rican residents maintain that, by attempting to impose
the death penalty, Congress has violated the compact17 made between
Puerto Rico and the United States in 1950 under the Puerto Rico Federal
Relations Act (PRFRA), commonly known as the Jones Act,18 which
granted the Puerto Rican government the power to author its own consti-
tution.19  The Puerto Rican consensus against the application of the death
penalty against Puerto Rican defendants is further demonstrated by the
fact that no Puerto Rican jury has ever sentenced a Puerto Rican defen-
dant to death under the FDPA, regardless of the severity of the defen-
dant’s crime.20  In keeping with this tradition, on September 27, 2012, a
Puerto Rican jury sentenced Burgos Montes to life in prison for
Morales’s murder.21
The federal death penalty has already survived constitutional chal-
lenges raised by stateside defendants alleging that the imposition of the
penalty violates federal capital defendants’ Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess rights.22  Likewise, in United States v. Acosta-Martinez, Puerto Ri-
can defendants Hector Oscar Acosta-Martinez and Joel Rivera-Alejandro
unsuccessfully raised a due process challenge to the application of the
federal death penalty in Puerto Rico upon receiving notice that the prose-
15 See, e.g., Alfonso, supra note 6, at 1093 (2007) (“As the First Circuit recognized,
there are widespread political, philosophical, cultural, as well as religious views, supporting
consensus in Puerto Rico condemning the death penalty.”).  The term “Puerto Rican defen-
dant” and other similar terms are used throughout this Note to refer to defendants charged with
committing federal capital crimes in Puerto Rico.
16 P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Acosta Martinez, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311, 312 (D.P.R. 2000)
(“[A]s part of the bilateral agreement governing the federal government’s relations with Puerto
Rico, the Commonwealth Constitution, even if considered a federal statute, may not be unilat-
erally altered by Congress.”); Alfonso, supra note 6, at 1087 (noting that the U.S. govern-
ment’s ability to impose the death penalty against Puerto Rican defendants makes the
existence of a compact “simply a castle in the air”).
18 Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731b (2006)).
19 48 U.S.C. § 731b (2006).
20 Francisco Rodrı´guez Burns, Edison Burgos Montes Sentenciado a Cadena Perpetua,
PRIMERA HORA (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.primerahora.com/edisonburgosmontes
sentenciadoacadenaperpetua-703835.html.
21 Id.
22 See United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that admitting
evidence that is ordinarily inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence during the penalty
phase of an FDPA capital trial does not automatically render the statute unconstitutional be-
cause the FDPA requires that evidence be excluded where its probative value is outweighed by
its prejudicial nature); United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 66–70 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding
that the FDPA does not violate Fifth Amendment due process rights because there is no funda-
mental right to a continual opportunity for exoneration).
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cution intended to seek the death penalty against them.23  In Acosta-Mar-
tinez, the defendants argued that Congress had an obligation to respect
the prohibition of the death penalty provided by the Constitution of Pu-
erto Rico, in part, because residents of Puerto Rico lack congressional
representation and cannot vote in presidential elections.24  While the Pu-
erto Rico District Court agreed with the defendants,25 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that Congress has the authority to impose
penalties for federal offenses in Puerto Rico and reinstated the defend-
ants’ death penalty notice.26
Although the imposition of the federal death penalty in Puerto Rico
has been widely criticized on constitutional grounds, none of these criti-
cisms have been specifically premised on the notion that the federal
death penalty, as applied in Puerto Rico, violates the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments”27 under the Su-
preme Court’s “evolving standards of decency” test.28  This test is
derived from Supreme Court precedent, which holds that the Eighth
Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”29  When conducting
this evolving standards of decency analysis, the Court compares each
state’s most reliable “objective indicia” of societal values, which is usu-
ally comprised of state legislative and state jury sentencing data, to deter-
mine whether a national consensus opposes the application of a specific
punishment upon a particular class of defendants.30
This Note will argue that Puerto Rico is so politically, historically,
and culturally different from the American states that a national consen-
sus regarding the imposition of the federal death penalty in Puerto Rico
cannot be determined by comparing the objective indicia gathered from
Puerto Rico residents to the objective indicia gathered from the states.
Thus, the imposition of the federal death penalty against Puerto Rican
capital defendants can only pass constitutional muster under the Supreme
Court’s evolving standards of decency test if the objective indicia of so-
cietal values gathered solely from Puerto Rico residents fails to demon-
strate an opposition to the penalty.  Part I of this Note will provide a
general overview of the Eighth Amendment and an in-depth analysis of
the Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency test.  Part II will give
an overview of the federal death penalty, explain how it applies in Puerto
23 252 F.3d 13, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2001).
24 Id.
25 See United States v. Acosta Martinez, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311, 322 (D.P.R. 2000).
26 Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d at 20–21.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
28 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958).
29 Id.
30 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (plurality opinion).
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Rico, and examine the facts of Acosta-Martinez.  Part III will demon-
strate how the evolving standards of decency test should be applied to
Puerto Rican defendants.
I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT “EVOLVING STANDARDS
OF DECENCY” TEST
A. General Overview of the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment states that “cruel and unusual punishments
[shall not be] inflicted.”31  The imposition of “cruel and unusual punish-
ments” is also proscribed under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.32  Although it is widely accepted that the
Framers included the Eighth Amendment in the Bill of Rights to prevent
the legislature from having “unfettered power to prescribe punishments
for crimes,”33 the express meaning of the term cruel and unusual punish-
ments has been the subject of many Supreme Court decisions due to its
ambiguity.34
In Furman v. Georgia, one of the Supreme Court’s landmark deci-
sions that helped define the meaning of cruel and unusual punishments,
Justice Brennan acknowledged that the term is “not susceptible of precise
definition,” but that the Court has a duty, “when the issue is properly
presented, to determine the constitutional validity of a challenged punish-
ment.”35  He then quoted the words of Patrick Henry from the Virginia
Ratifying Convention: “[W]hen we come to punishments, no latitude
ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives.”36
Justice Brennan noted that a government imposes cruel and unusual
punishments where it “arbitrarily . . . subject[s] a person to an unusually
severe punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as ac-
ceptable, and that cannot be shown to serve any penal purpose more
effectively than a significantly less drastic punishment.”37  Justice Bren-
nan’s formulation of the cruel and unusual punishments test identifies
three criteria that must be met for a punishment to comport with the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments: the
31 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962).
33 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
34 See, e.g., id. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Almost a century ago, this Court ob-
served that ‘[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the
constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted.’”).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 260–61.
37 Id. at 286 (emphasis added); see also id. at 312 (White, J., concurring) (noting that the
death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment when it provides “only marginal contributions to
any discernible social or public purposes”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-1\CJP105.txt unknown Seq: 7 11-NOV-13 10:33
2013] WHEN STANDARDS COLLIDE 163
punishment must not be so severe as to degrade human dignity;38 must
not be arbitrarily inflicted;39 and cannot be unacceptable to contemporary
society.40
A punishment can be cruel due to its unreasonable severity or when
it is imposed on defendants based on their innate characteristics rather
than their culpability for a particular crime.41  The prohibition of the ar-
bitrary or “unusual” infliction of severe punishment is derived from a
similar notion that “the State does not respect human dignity when, with-
out reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it does
not inflict upon others,”42 and discriminates against a defendant due to
“race, religion, wealth, social position, or class” or if it imposes severe
punishments “under a procedure that gives room for the play of such
prejudices.”43
The notion that a punishment’s retributive and deterrent values
should be considered when determining whether a punishment is cruel
and unusual protects defendants by ensuring that they are only subject to
punishments that are proportionate to their crime. 44  Moreover, by rec-
ognizing the importance of having societal approval for criminal punish-
ments, the Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged the need for
additional safeguards against the application of cruel and unusual punish-
ments upon defendants.45
38 Id. at 273–74 (Brennan, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 274.
40 Id. at 277.
41 See id. at 272–73 (“The true significance of these punishments is that they treat mem-
bers of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded.”).
42 Id. at 274.
43 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).  Black capital defendants disproportionately sen-
tenced to death by white southern juries are a primary example of the type of discriminatory
and arbitrarily imposed punishments that the Furman Court was trying to prevent when it
temporarily invalidated the death penalty.  In his concurrence, Justice Marshall noted the fol-
lowing statistics:
Regarding discrimination, it has been said that ‘[i]t is usually the poor, the illiterate,
the underprivileged, the member of the minority group—the man who, because he is
without means, and is defended by a court-appointed attorney—who becomes soci-
ety’s sacrificial lamb . . . .’  Indeed, a look at the bare statistics regarding executions
is enough to betray much of the discrimination.  A total of 3,859 persons have been
executed since 1930, of whom 1,751 were white and 2,066 were Negro.  Of the
executions, 3,334 were for murder; 1,664 of the executed murderers were white and
1,630 were Negro; 455 persons, including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, were exe-
cuted for rape.  It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often
than whites in proportion to their percentage of the population.  Studies indicate that
while the higher rate of execution among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of
crime, there is evidence of racial discrimination.
Id. at 364–65.
44 See id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
45 Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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B. The “Evolving Standards of Decency” Test
The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment evolving standards of de-
cency test embodies the idea that a penalty for a particular offense may
be impermissible today, regardless of whether or not the penalty was
imposed in the past for the same offense.46  Although not expressly es-
tablished until the twentieth century, the test has been present in Ameri-
can jurisprudence, at least in essence, for over a century.47  In Weems v.
United States, one of the first decisions to examine public opinion when
considering the constitutionality of punishments under the Eighth
Amendment, the Court held that a Philippine court’s sentence of fifteen
years imprisonment for falsifying government documents was unconsti-
tutionally severe.48  To reach this conclusion, the Court determined that
the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments “is not fastened to the
obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlight-
ened by a humane justice.”49  The Weems holding is historically signifi-
cant because it marked the first time the Supreme Court invalidated a
penalty prescribed by a legislature for a particular offense, thus demon-
strating that the legislature should not be given unchecked discretion to
impose punishments that fail to comport with the societal norms that em-
body current standards of fairness and justice.50
The Supreme Court incorporated its Eighth Amendment analysis
from Weems in Trop v. Dulles and developed the evolving standards of
decency test by determining that the Eighth Amendment is not static and
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”51  The Court reinforced this
conclusion in its decision in Furman v. Georgia, which invalidated all
then-existing American capital sentencing schemes for violating the
Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments. 52
Although the Furman dissent remained unconvinced that the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments rendered the
death penalty unconstitutional, it acknowledged that society plays a criti-
cal role in determining whether a punishment is, in fact, constitutionally
acceptable:
A punishment is inordinately cruel . . . chiefly as per-
ceived by the society so characterizing it.  The standard
of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessa-
46 See id. at 329–30 (Marshall, J., concurring).
47 See id.
48 217 U.S. 349, 380–81 (1910).
49 Id. at 378.
50 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J., concurring).
51 356 U.S. 86, 100–01.
52 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239 (per curiam).
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rily embodies a moral judgment.  The standard itself re-
mains the same, but its applicability must change as the
basic mores of society change.53
In his concurrence, Justice Marshall also drew an important distinction
between the weight that should be given to public opinions based on all
of the available relevant facts and the weight that should be given to
public opinions that reflect beliefs formed independently from the rele-
vant facts.54  He noted that the evolving standards of decency analysis, as
applied to the death penalty, does not hinge on “whether a substantial
proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital
punishment is barbarously cruel, but [on] whether they would find it to
be so in the light of all information presently available.”55  This distinc-
tion helped define the outer limits of the evolving standards of decency
test by identifying the specific type of public opinion courts can use to
guide their Eighth Amendment analyses.
The Supreme Court continued to shape, define, and clarify the
evolving standards of decency test in many of its post-Furman Eighth
Amendment capital punishment cases.  In its 1976 decision in Gregg v.
Georgia, the Court noted:
[A]n assessment of contemporary values concerning the
infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the ap-
plication of the Eighth Amendment. . . .  [T]his assess-
ment does not call for a subjective judgment.  It requires,
rather, that we look to objective indicia that reflect the
public attitude toward a given sanction.56
The requirement that courts examine objective indicia to determine pub-
lic opinion was reinforced by the Court’s subsequent decisions. 57  The
Court ultimately determined that the two most reliable means of deter-
mining public opinion are state legislation, the strongest indicator which
cumulatively represents national consensus ratified through elected rep-
53 Id. at 382–83 (Burger, J., dissenting).
54 See id. at 362 (Marshall, J., concurring).
55 Id.
56 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion).
57 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (“The beginning point is a review of
objective indicia of consensus. . . .  These data give us essential instruction.”); Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304, 339–40 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Under our Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, a punishment is ‘cruel and unusual’ if it falls within . . . modes of punishment
that are inconsistent with modern ‘standards of decency,’ as evinced by objective indicia, the
most important of which is ‘legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’” (quoting Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330–31 (1989) and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405
(1986))); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“Final resolution of
the question [of whether a punishment is constitutionally valid] must await careful inquiry into
objective indicators of society’s ‘evolving standards of decency,’ particularly legislative enact-
ments and the responses of juries in capital cases.”).
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resentatives, and state jury sentencing data, which embodies the “link
between community values and the penal system.” 58
Today, the Supreme Court maintains that national consensus alone
is not dispositive as to whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.59
Courts must still consider the Supreme Court’s precedent and prior inter-
pretations of the Eighth Amendment when determining the constitution-
ality of a particular punishment.60  In addition, courts are obligated to
ensure that their Eighth Amendment holdings are not based solely on the
subjective views of their presiding judges.61
The Supreme Court often includes national consensus in its opin-
ions when the national consensus supports the Court’s interpretations of
its own precedent and the Eighth Amendment.62  Interestingly, while the
Court includes evidence of public opinion in its constitutional analyses
when it buttresses its own conclusions, the Court has never rendered an
opinion in which the majority admits to contradicting national consen-
sus.63  While it is possible that this coincidence may be explained by
assuming that the Supreme Court has never contradicted national consen-
sus, it is much more realistic to assume that the Court either ignores
unfavorable legislative and jury sentencing data or simply manipulates
the relevant data to conform with its preferred outcome.64
58 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).  The Supreme Court has also
considered international opinion while attempting to determine national consensus, but this
consideration has traditionally been given considerably less weight than state legislation and
jury sentencing data and, thus, has not been considered in all Supreme Court cases involving
the “evolving standards of decency” test.  For an example of the Supreme Court’s use of
international opinion to determine national consensus, see Enmund v. Florida, in which the
Court notes that another country’s acceptance of a particular punishment for a specific offense
can weigh into the “evolving standards of decency” analysis.  458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982)
(citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10).
59 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
60 Id.
61 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion).
62 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 65–66 (2005) (noting that because the majority in Roper v.
Simmons ignored evidence that contradicted its desired result, the majority’s use of objective
indicia favoring its position was not “distinct from the advocacy of the decision in the Court’s
opinion”). Additional examples are provided later in Part I.C.
63 See infra Part I.C.
64 See generally, Posner, supra note 62; Bethany Siena, Note, Kennedy v. Louisiana
Reaffirms the Necessity of Revising the Eighth Amendment’s Evolving Standards of Decency
Analysis, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 259 (2010) (noting the difficulty of determining national
consensus by using objective indicia of societal values due to the Supreme Court’s propensity
to selectively employ the evolving standards of decency analysis to support its own conclu-
sions).  See Part I.C for specific examples of how members of the Court have reached different
conclusions when analyzing the same objective indicia data.
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C. Irregularities in the Application of the “Evolving Standards of
Decency” Test
The evolving standards of decency test is widely criticized for being
highly manipulable because it lacks a specific standard for how to cor-
rectly interpret objective indicia.65  Comparing the Supreme Court’s
treatment of objective indicia in previous decisions demonstrates this
manipulability.
In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court ruled that the imposition of capi-
tal punishment for murders committed by sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds was not a cruel and unusual punishment 66 because the defendants
failed to demonstrate a national consensus opposed to it.67  The Court
noted that, of the thirty-seven death penalty states, only fifteen, or 40.5%,
declined to impose the death penalty on sixteen-year-old capital offend-
ers and twelve, or 32.4%, declined to impose it on seventeen-year-old
capital offenders.68  While the Court acknowledged that relatively few
juries sentenced capital juvenile defendants to death, it attributed this low
figure to the fact that juveniles commit fewer capital crimes than
adults.69  Rather than using jury sentencing data to consider whether the
juvenile death penalty was cruel and unusual, the Court simply con-
cluded that the fact that juvenile defendants accounted for only fifteen
out of 2,105 death sentences delivered between 1982 and 1988 and only
2% of executions carried out between 1642 and 1986 failed to demon-
strate a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty.70
A plurality of justices also refused to consider alternative objective
indicia, such as public opinion polls and the views of interest groups and
professional organizations.71  The plurality stated that these alternative
types of evidence had “uncertain foundations” and that a permanent, na-
tionwide prohibition of the juvenile death penalty required that a national
65 See, e.g., Wayne Myers, Supreme Court Review: Roper v. Simmons: The Collision of
National Consensus and Proportionality Review, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 947, 986
(2006) (“[I]f a majority of the Court believes, based on their own moral judgment, that it is
disproportionate punishment to execute an offender, then the death penalty itself could be
declared unconstitutional so long as it was accompanied by a facade of a corresponding trend
in the indicia of a national consensus.”); Posner, supra note 62; Siena, supra note 64, at
263–64.
66 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
67 Id. at 373.
68 Id. at 370–71.
69 Id. at 373–74.
70 Id.; but see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is
legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily.”).
71 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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consensus against the penalty “appear in the operative acts, or the laws
and the application of laws, that the people have approved.”72
The Stanford dissent reached the opposite conclusion by adding the
fifteen non-death penalty states and Washington D.C. to the twelve states
prohibiting capital punishment for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old of-
fenders.73  The dissent also argued that, although nineteen death penalty
states lacked a minimum age for capital defendants, it could not be as-
sumed that those states affirmatively chose to allow the imposition of the
juvenile death penalty simply because their state legislatures had failed to
consider the issue.74  Moreover, the dissent pointed out that the death
penalty was rarely imposed on juveniles75 and that respected expert orga-
nizations, such as the American Bar Association, opposed the infliction
of the death penalty upon juvenile defendants.76  These indicators per-
suaded the dissent that the death penalty violated evolving standards of
decency when imposed against juvenile defendants.77
As in Stanford, the majority in Kennedy v. Louisiana reached the
opposite conclusion as the dissent despite relying on many of the same
objective indicia.78  In Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that capital
punishment is unconstitutional when imposed for child rape.79  The
Court based its decision on the fact that: only six out of forty-two states
allowed capital punishment for child rape; 80 that Louisiana was the only
state to sentence a defendant to death for child rape since 1964;81 and
that Congress, although it had passed the FDPA and expanded the num-
ber of death-eligible federal crimes, including some for non-homicide
offenses, had not enacted a law permitting the imposition of the death
penalty for child rape.82
In sharp contrast to the majority, the Kennedy dissent argued that
the fact that only six states allowed the death penalty for child rape was
an unreliable indicator of national consensus.83  The dissent maintained
that that figure failed to reflect the opinions of state legislators who were
deterred from permitting the imposition of the death penalty in child rape
cases following the Supreme Court’s holding in Coker v. Georgia, in
72 Id.
73 Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 385.
75 Id. at 386–87.
76 Id. at 388.
77 Id. at 405.
78 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
79 Id. at 421.
80 Id. at 423.
81 Id. at 434.
82 Id. at 423.
83 Id. at 448 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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which the Court held that adult rape is not a death-eligible offense.84
Moreover, the dissent maintained that the fact that five states specifically
established child rape as a death-eligible offense only a few years prior to
Kennedy might be evidence of a national trend moving toward making
child rape a capital offense.85  The dissent concluded that state legisla-
tures were constrained from expressing their own understanding of socie-
tal standards of decency due to the Coker holding and became even more
hesitant to make child rape a death-eligible offense in the months follow-
ing the grant of certiorari for the Kennedy case.86  Thus, in the eyes of
the dissent, the fact that state legislatures and juries declined to impose
the death penalty on defendants convicted of child rape reflected the
states’ reaction to the Supreme Court, rather than a national consensus
regarding the acceptability of imposing the death penalty for child rape.87
As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court’s determination of
whether a particular punishment comports with evolving standards of de-
cency depends on: the manner in which the Court chooses to count the
states that favor or oppose a particular punishment; how the Court
chooses to interpret jury sentencing data, by either concluding that it
demonstrates national consensus or deciding that it reflects factors unre-
lated to national consensus; and whether the Court chooses to consider
alternative sources of objective indicia, such as public opinion polls, in
addition to state legislature and jury sentencing data.88  Thus, it would be
relatively simple for a court to dismiss the argument that the federal
death penalty fails the evolving standards of decency test when applied
to Puerto Rican defendants by merely construing the relevant objective
indicia in a manner that fails to demonstrate that the national consensus
is opposed to the application of the federal death penalty in Puerto
Rico.89
D. How to Correctly Apply the “Evolving Standards of Decency”
Test in Puerto Rico
As shown in the previous section, the manipulability of the evolving
standards of decency test is an unpredictable double-edged sword that
can either help or condemn defendants depending on how courts choose
84 Id. at 448–49 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).
85 Id. at 461.
86 Id. at 460–61.
87 See id.
88 For additional examples demonstrating this point, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
603 (1977) and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
89 For example, a court could find that the national consensus supports the application of
the federal death penalty in Puerto Rico for a particular offense by making the argument that
the majority of states allow the death penalty to be imposed against defendants and that these
states also allow the death penalty to be imposed for the same federal capital offense.
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to construe the available objective indicia.  To ensure that the test can be
correctly applied to federal capital defendants in Puerto Rico, it is neces-
sary to first establish exactly how data gathered from objective indicia
should be interpreted when the evolving standards of decency analysis is
specifically applied to Puerto Rican capital defendants.  Since the Su-
preme Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent controls, the correct
method for interpreting objective indicia data would need to comport
with the Court’s previous applications of the evolving standards of de-
cency test.  The most accurate method for interpreting objective indicia
would be derived from the manner in which the Supreme Court has used
objective indicia to determine evolving standards of decency in the past.
Although members of the Court have considered data from Wash-
ington D.C. when conducting their evolving standards of decency analy-
ses,90 no member of the Court has ever included objective indicia from
Puerto Rico despite the fact that Congress and the American courts treat
Puerto Rico as a state when it is convenient.91  Thus, although the Court
may consider non-states in its evolving standards of decency analysis, it
does not automatically consider the objective indicia from all non-states
and territories.92  It is surprising that no member of the Court has ever
used Puerto Rican legislative and jury sentencing data when considering
the constitutionality of the federal death penalty.93  It could be argued
90 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 824 n.16 (1988) (“Henceforth, the
opinion will refer to the 50 States and the District of Columbia as ‘States,’ for sake of
simplicity.”).
91 See Organic Act of 1900, ch. 191, § 14, 31 Stat. 77, 80 (1900) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 48 U.S.C.) (the laws of the United States apply in Puerto Rico when they
are not “locally inapplicable”); infra Part II.C (explaining how the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that the federal death penalty can be imposed on residents of Puerto Rico).
92 Controversy also surrounds the imposition of the federal death penalty against Native
Americans who commit federal capital offenses against other Native Americans on Native
American land. See United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
federal death penalty is applicable in Native American territories, even when the crimes are
against other Native Americans on Native American territory).  The imposition of the federal
death penalty against Native Americans who commit federal capital offenses against other
Native Americans on Native American soil can be distinguished from the current situation in
Puerto Rico by the fact that Native Americans are granted more federal rights.  For example,
they are permitted to vote in the presidential elections.  However, it is important to note that in
Mitchell, the Native American defendant claimed that the federal death penalty failed to meet
evolving standards of decency because he committed the capital crimes when he was twenty
years old. Id. at 981.  Had the defendant argued that Native American territories cannot be
compared to other state and federal jurisdictions and that the federal death penalty fails to meet
evolving standards of decency within the context of Native American societal standards, the
Court would have had to consider whether or not Native American territories should be com-
pared and contrasted with state and federal jurisdictions for the purposes of determining evolv-
ing standards of decency.
93 Since residents of Puerto Rico oppose the death penalty, it would make sense for
justices who disfavor the death penalty to look to Puerto Rican legislative and jury sentencing
data to further their arguments.
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that Puerto Rico is implicitly represented in the Court’s analysis when-
ever the Court refers to the federal system’s approval or disapproval of
the imposition death penalty for certain crimes.  However, it cannot be
reasonably argued that federal statutes represent the consensus of the Pu-
erto Rican people because Puerto Rico residents are barred from voting
in presidential elections and are unable to elect congressional representa-
tives who have voting power.94  Moreover, the fact that the Supreme
Court always looks to the legislature and jury sentencing data of individ-
ual states when ascertaining national consensus indicates that the public
opinion of each individual state is an essential element of the evolving
standards of decency test.95
The omission of Puerto Rico’s objective indicia from the applica-
tion of the Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency test implies
that Puerto Rico is so fundamentally different from the states that its
objective indicia cannot be used to determine the American national con-
sensus.  Therefore, objective indicia gathered from the states cannot be
used to determine a national consensus that reflects a Puerto Rican con-
sensus because a Puerto Rican consensus can only be derived from re-
sidents of Puerto Rico.
94 See 48 U.S.C. §891 (2006) (allowing Puerto Ricans to elect a resident commissioner,
not a senator or representative); Iguartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir.
1994) (holding that Puerto Rico residents have no right under Article II of the U.S. Constitu-
tion to vote in presidential elections because the President is chosen by electors chosen by each
state).
95 The Supreme Court has not heard any federal death penalty cases in which the defen-
dant raised an Eighth Amendment claim requiring an evolving standards of decency analysis.
This is probably due, in part, to the fact that the claim would need to be properly raised by a
defendant to be considered by the Court.  Thus, no federal death penalty case to date specifi-
cally goes through the evolving standards of decency analysis typically undertaken by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding
that the defendant must present an Eighth Amendment claim for evolving standards of decency
to be considered).  Some courts have dismissed Eighth Amendment evolving standards of de-
cency claims filed by federal capital defendants by concluding that “to the extent our standards
of decency have evolved since the enactment of the Constitution, they still permit punishment
by death for certain heinous crimes such as murder.”  United States v. Hammer, No.
4:96–CR–239, 2011 WL 6020577, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2011) (quoting Quinones, 313 F.3d
at 61–62); see also United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 273–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (hold-
ing that the death penalty, under previous evolving standards of decency analyses, does not
violate the Eighth Amendment per se).  Since this type of broad and sweeping conclusion is
unlike the type of analysis typically employed by the Supreme Court to ascertain evolving
standards of decency, it cannot be presumed that the Supreme Court will necessarily use this
same type of generalization if it ever presides over a case involving a federal capital defen-
dant’s Eighth Amendment claim requiring the application of the evolving standards of decency
test.
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II. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY AND ITS APPLICATION
IN PUERTO RICO
A. General Overview of the Federal Death Penalty
The First American Congress introduced the death penalty in 1790,
reserving the punishment for crimes against the United States, such as
treason, murder, piracy, and forgery.96  The Fifth Amendment, which re-
quires the “presentment or indictment of a grand jury” before charging
defendants with “capital” crimes, also implies acceptance of the death
penalty by its drafters.97
Congress reformed the federal death penalty in 1897 by reducing
the number of death-eligible federal offenses to five and allowing juries
to choose between a death or life sentence for convicted defendants.98
The punishment remained in full effect until 1967, when pressure from
death penalty abolitionists caused a moratorium on executions.99  Subse-
quently, the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia inval-
idated all American death penalty schemes for failing to comply with the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishments.100
Congress enacted the first set of constitutionally sufficient federal
death penalty procedures since Furman under the National Narcotics
Leadership Act of 1998.101  Under the Act, a capital sentence may be
imposed against defendants convicted of “intentionally kill[ing] or . . .
caus[ing] the intentional killing of an individual” in furtherance of a
“continuing criminal enterprise.”102  In 1994, Congress passed the
FDPA, which created general federal procedures for the imposition of
the death penalty and extended these procedures to over forty
offenses.103
Federal capital crimes are currently tried in a bifurcated system.  Ju-
rors first decide whether the defendant is guilty and, if so, determine the
defendant’s punishment in a second proceeding known as the sentencing
96 Rory K. Little, The Future of the Death Penalty, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 513, 538
(2000).
97 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
98 Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 367 (1999).
99 Nicci Lovre-Laughlin, Lethal Decisions: Examining the Role of Prosecutorial Discre-
tion in Capital Cases in South Dakota and the Federal Justice System, 50 S.D. L. REV. 550,
554 (2005).  The last execution to take place before the moratorium was that of Luis Monge, a
Puerto Rican native living in Denver, Colorado.  Michael L. Radelet, Capital Punishment in
Colorado: 1859–1972, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 885, 922, 1008 (2003).
100 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
101 See Pub. L. No. 100–690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4387–95 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 (2006)); Little, supra note 96, at 531.
102 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2006).
103 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3598 (2006); Little, supra note 98, at 349–50.
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phase.104  The FDPA applies to federal defendants tried in states whose
laws do not allow the death penalty,105 a provision courts have upheld
against Eighth106 and Tenth Amendment107 challenges.
B. Statutes Governing the Application of the Federal Death Penalty
in Puerto Rico
The United States officially acquired Puerto Rico from Spain in
1898 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris following the conclusion of
the Spanish–American War.108  With the ratification of the Foraker Act
in 1900, the island officially became subject to all United States laws
“not locally inapplicable.”109  As in non-death penalty states, the federal
death penalty is applicable to Puerto Rican defendants through the
FDPA.110
Puerto Rico has its own federal district court, presided over by pre-
sidentially appointed Article III judges.111  The First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Boston, Massachusetts, hears appeals from the Puerto Rico
district court.112  Since Puerto Rico lacks the facilities to carry out an
execution, Puerto Rican capital defendants who receive the death penalty
would need to be transferred to a facility in the contiguous United States
to await execution.113
C. United States v. Acosta-Martinez
In United States v. Acosta-Martinez, defendants Hector Oscar
Acosta-Martinez and Joel Rivera-Alejandro were accused of kidnapping
104 See 18 U.S.C. § 3593.
105 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a).
106 See United States v. Jacques, No. 2:08–CR–117, 2011 WL 3881033, at *3, *6 (D. Vt.
2011) (rejecting defendant’s argument that, because Vermont state law did not authorize capi-
tal punishment, federal capital prosecution was illegal and therefore “unusual” under the
Eighth Amendment); see also United States v. Johnson, No. CR 01–3046–MWB, 2012 WL
5275491, at *9, *11 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (agreeing with the Jacques court’s reasoning in re-
jecting a similar Eighth Amendment challenge to the application of the federal death penalty
where state law does not permit capital punishment).
107 See United States v. Tuck Chong, 123 F. Supp. 2d 563, 566 & n.17, 567–68 (D. Haw.
1999) (determining that the Tenth Amendment is not implicated in cases where the United
States tries a defendant for a federal capital offense in a state that does not allow the death
penalty because federal crimes affect federal interests, and the Constitution delegates to the
federal government the power to determine punishment for offenses against the United States).
108 See Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain,
U.S.-Spain, art. II, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
109 Organic Act of 1900, ch. 191, § 14, 31 Stat. 77, 80 (1900) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 48 U.S.C.).
110 United States v. Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001); see also infra Part II.C.
111 Act of September 12, 1966, Pub. L. 89-571, 80 Stat. 764 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 134 (2006)).
112 See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
113 See Alfonso, supra note 6, at 1102.
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grocer Jorge Herna´ndez Dı´az, demanding a $1 million ransom from his
son, and warning Herna´ndez Dı´az’s family not to contact the police.114
When Herna´ndez Dı´az’s family contacted the police, the defendants shot
Herna´ndez Dı´az to death, dismembered his body with an ax, and dis-
posed of the remains in bags dumped alongside the road.115  In addition
to other non-capital crimes, the defendants were charged with “using or
carrying a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence which results
in death under circumstances constituting first degree murder,” in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), and “killing a person to retaliate against his
family for providing information to law enforcement officers about the
commission of a federal offense,” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513(a)(1)(B).116  Following the indictment, the U.S. government filed
notice of its intent to seek the death penalty in the event of conviction.117
In response, Acosta-Martinez and Rivera-Alejandro raised a substantive
due process challenge to the imposition of the federal death penalty in
Puerto Rico in the Puerto Rico District Court.118
Although the defendants won in district court, on appeal, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the death penalty applies to Puerto
Rico capital defendants because the Constitution of Puerto Rico operates
solely to organize local government and, thus, federal statutes are as ap-
plicable in Puerto Rico as they are in the states. 119  In reversing the
District Court’s holding that the FDPA is “locally inapplicable” in Puerto
Rico under the PRFRA, the Court of Appeals concluded:
The death penalty is intended to apply to Puerto Rico
federal criminal defendants just as it applies to such de-
fendants in the various states.  This choice by Congress
does not contravene Puerto Rico’s decision to bar the
death penalty in prosecutions for violations of crimes
under the Puerto Rican criminal laws in the Common-
wealth courts.120
114 252 F.3d 13, 15 n.1 (1st Cir. 2001).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 15.  One of the defense lawyers representing Rivera-Alejandro, Rafael Castro
Lang, argued that the defendants should not have been prosecuted in the federal legal system,
in part, because one of the U.S. government’s arguments for jurisdiction, that the victim was a
grocer and thus engaged in interstate commerce, was contrived.  John-Thor Dahlburg, Acquit-
tals Quash a U.S. Bid for Death Penalties in Puerto Rico, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2003), http://
articles.latimes.com/2003/aug/02/nation/na-acquit2.
117 United States v. Acosta Martinez, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311, 312 (D.P.R. 2000), rev’d 252
F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001).
118 Id. at 311–12.  Note that the defendants raised a Fifth Amendment claim rather than an
Eighth Amendment claim.
119 Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d at 18, 20.
120 Id. at 20.
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The Acosta-Martinez court applied the Supreme Court’s “shocking
to the conscience” test to conclude that the death penalty is applicable in
Puerto Rico for capital offenses because federal law has routinely been
applied in Puerto Rico.121  The court concluded: “It cannot shock the
conscience of the court to apply to Puerto Rico, as intended by Congress,
a federal penalty for a federal crime which Congress has applied to the
fifty states.”122  The court also noted that granting jurors the opportunity
to consider the death penalty for federal capital defendants does not actu-
ally require them to impose it.123  Thus, according to the court’s ratio-
nale, under the FDPA the question of whether the death penalty will be
imposed on a defendant is always directly in the hands of a local Puerto
Rican jury, which for all effects and purposes embodies the will of the
Puerto Rican people.  Following the First Circuit’s ruling, Acosta-Marti-
nez petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which the Court
denied.124
As in the rest of the United States, the U.S. Constitution protects
and enforces the fundamental rights of Puerto Ricans living in Puerto
Rico.125  However, the First Circuit’s narrow decision failed to explore
whether the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause shields Puerto Rico defendants from being subject to the death
penalty.  Specifically, the court failed to consider whether the Supreme
Court’s evolving standards of decency test forbids the federal govern-
ment from seeking the death penalty against Puerto Rican defendants.
The court’s failure to consider the evolving standards of decency test in
Acosta-Martinez and the defense’s failure to raise an Eighth Amendment
argument governed by that test might be attributed to the fact that many
of death penalty cases that shaped the Supreme Court’s evolving stan-
dards of decency test into what it is today had not yet been decided.126
However, a more concerning implication is that the First Circuit’s
mechanical application of federal statutes in Acosta-Martinez could be
attributed to the court’s ignorance of the relevance of Puerto Rico’s cul-
tural and societal values and the importance of taking them into consider-
ation to reach its verdict.127
121 Id. at 21.
122 Id. (emphasis added).
123 Id. at 19.
124 Acosta-Martinez v. United States, 535 U.S. 906 (2002).
125 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304, 312–13 (1922).
126 For some examples of cases that helped shape the evolving standards of decency test
into its modern form, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (child rapists); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 615, 578 (2005) (offenders who were younger than eighteen when
they committed their crimes); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (criminals with
intellectual disabilities).
127 For example, because the presiding judge in Acosta-Martinez, Judge Sandra Lynch, is
not a Puerto Rico native, it is unlikely that she would have been aware of Puerto Rico’s unique
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The Puerto Rico District Court’s decision, written by Judge Salva-
dor E. Casellas, provides a stark contrast with the First Circuit’s decision.
In his decision, Judge Casellas concluded:
In summary, (1) the purpose of establishing Common-
wealth status in Puerto Rico was to develop and enhance
self-government by the people of Puerto Rico and create
an autonomous political entity; (2) in voting to accept
Public Law 600—adopted by Congress as a compact
with the people of Puerto Rico—the people of Puerto
Rico accepted section 9 of the PRFRA, which provides
for the applicability to the Commonwealth of all Federal
law if not locally inapplicable; (3) the Commonwealth
Constitution, which was adopted by the Puerto Rican
people and approved by Congress, expressly prohibits
capital punishment in Puerto Rico; (4) Puerto Rico’s cul-
ture, traditions and values are repugnant to the death
penalty; and (5) the FDPA was not specifically made ex-
tensive to Puerto Rico.  Under these circumstances, the
Court concludes that the FDPA is locally inapplicable
within the meaning of section 9 of the PRFRA.128
Interestingly, Judge Casellas employed a test similar to the evolving
standards of decency test by incorporating Puerto Rican culture, tradi-
tions, and values into his decision even though the defendants did not
raise Eighth Amendment claims.129  The contrast between the Puerto
Rico District Court’s and the First Circuit’s Acosta-Martinez decisions
demonstrates how a judge’s personal knowledge or bias can affect
whether or not evolving standards of decency will be considered in any
particular case.  This raises another problem with imposing the federal
death penalty in Puerto Rico: convicted federal capital defendants in Pu-
erto Rico may only appeal to the First Circuit in Boston.  The question
then becomes whether a court so removed from Puerto Rico’s culture can
properly apply the evolving standards of decency test to Puerto Rican
defendants.
cultural and political history and its relevance to the federal death penalty. See generally
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGe-
tInfo?jid=1447 (last visited April 8, 2013) (Judge Lynch was born in Oak Park, Illinois).  In
addition, the First Circuit Court of Appeals is in Boston. Court Location, U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT, http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/court-info/court-location (last
visited May 23, 2013).
128 United States v. Acosta Martinez, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311, 321 (D.P.R. 2000), rev’d, 252
F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001).
129 See id.
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III. APPLYING THE “EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY” TEST
TO PUERTO RICAN DEFENDANTS
A. Puerto Rico’s “Evolving Standards of Decency” Are Not
Comparable to Those of the States
Under the evolving standards of decency test, the FDPA should not
be imposed in Puerto Rico because it treats Puerto Rico as one of the
states, to which all federal laws automatically apply.  Treating Puerto
Rico as a state ignores the following important distinctions between Pu-
erto Rico and the American states: Puerto Rico residents are prohibited
from voting for president and lack congressional representatives who can
vote either for or against federal death penalty statutes;130 Puerto Rico is
an unincorporated territory that Congress never intended to make a
state;131 and not all federal laws automatically apply in Puerto Rico.132
Although the Supreme Court sometimes includes federal jurisdictions
when applying the evolving standards of decency test, because Puerto
Rico residents lack congressional representation and cannot vote in presi-
dential elections, federal legislation does not represent the will of the
Puerto Rican people.  In addition, the Court’s evolving standards of de-
cency precedents always include objective indicia from the states and
130 U.S. CONST. art. II § 1 cl. 2; 48 U.S.C. § 891 (2006).
131 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922).  Although the United States
granted Puerto Ricans citizenship within fifteen years of taking over the island, the purpose of
granting citizenship was to dissipate the Puerto Rican desire for independence that had grown
strong during the Spanish colonial regime. See RONALD FERNANDEZ, THE DISENCHANTED IS-
LAND 33 (2nd ed. 1996).  Today, there is an ongoing debate as to whether Puerto Rico should
become a state.  However, although 61.2% of Puerto Rican voters who participated in most
recent plebiscite held on the island on November 4, 2012 chose statehood over independence,
marking the first plebiscite in which the majority of voters chose statehood, the results of the
plebiscite may not accurately reflect the majority opinion.  Ed Morales, Analysis: The Puerto
Rico Plebiscite That Wasn’t, ABC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univi
sion/Opinion/puerto-rico-status-plebiscite/story?id=17674719.  These results are not conclu-
sive because 466,337 blank votes were cast, which means that statehood may have only gar-
nered 45.1% of the vote. Id. Moreover, even if the plebiscite results were correct, the results
do not bind Congress to take any action. See Roque Planas, Puerto Rico Status: White House
Gives Mixed Signals on Statehood, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/12/04/puerto-rico-status-white-_n_2237757.html (discussing how the vote
could prompt Congress to “consider” Puerto Rican statehood).
132 For example, Puerto Rico residents are exempt from paying federal taxes.  48 U.S.C.
§ 734 (2006).  It seems contradictory for Congress to provide this exemption while Puerto
Rico remains under the exclusive control of the federal government, since federal statutes that
are not “locally inapplicable” still apply to Puerto Rico.  This is even more surprising consider-
ing that Washington D.C. residents pay federal taxes despite their lack of congressional repre-
sentation.  This anomaly can be explained by Congress’s political incentives: Congress allows
these types of exceptions to prevent the Puerto Rican people from attempting to secede. See
generally FERNANDEZ, supra note 131.  Thus, like the Supreme Court, Congress chooses to
manipulate federal laws to reach its preferred outcome, regardless of whether their choices will
lead to inconsistent results.
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Puerto Rico is never treated as a state under the Court’s test.133  Thus,
because the Court’s framework separates Puerto Rico from the states, the
states’ consensus regarding the death penalty cannot control the constitu-
tionality of the application of the death penalty in Puerto Rico. Only
Puerto Rico can demonstrate a consensus regarding the application of the
death penalty in Puerto Rico.134
B. Puerto Rico’s Legislative Record Shows a Consensus Against the
Death Penalty
The Supreme Court emphasizes historical context when analyzing
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and unusual pun-
ishments.135  For example, in Trop v. Dulles, the Court stated, “[T]he
death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day
when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitu-
tional concept of cruelty.”136  Thus, to determine the true meaning of the
Constitution of Puerto Rico’s proscription of the death penalty, it is nec-
essary to examine the historical background of the death penalty in Pu-
erto Rico to verify whether the punishment was ever truly accepted by
the Puerto Rican people.
Puerto Rico was a Spanish colony from 1493 to 1898.137  Spain not
only utilized summary executions to conquer the island, 138 but also reg-
ularly imposed the death penalty to: control the island’s rapidly growing
slave population,139 establish Catholicism as the sole religion,140 punish
soldiers for desertion,141 and deter any other acts that threatened the sta-
bility of the colony or Spain’s pecuniary interests.142  Only the native
Spanish elite enjoyed the special privileges of appealing their death
133 See supra Part I.D.
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241–45 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(discussing the Eighth Amendment’s historical context).
136 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (emphasis added).
137 See JOS ´E TR´IAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE
WORLD 5–20 (1997).
138 JALIL SUED-BADILLO, LA PENA DE MUERTE EN PUERTO RICO: RETROSPECTIVA HIST ´OR-
ICA PARA UNA REFLEXI ´ON CONTEMPOR ´ANEA 18 (2000).  During the initial conquest, the Span-
ish declined to take prisoners of war because they regarded the native Taı´no Indians as
subjects who had committed treason by rebelling. Id.; see also TR´IAS MONGE, supra note 137,
at 5.
139 See SUED-BADILLO, supra note 138, at 20.
140 See id. at 22.
141 See id. at 30.
142 See id. at 24.  For a more detailed history of the Puerto Rican judicial system under
Spanish rule, see TR´IAS MONGE, supra note 137.
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sentences or escaping prosecution altogether.143  Thus, Puerto Ricans
were divided along socioeconomic lines into two distinct groups:
[There was the Puerto Rican] from the town, heterodox,
smuggler, mestizo, impulsive, impatient, consumer of
cassava bread and rum and [there was] the Puerto Rico
represented by the Capital, with their military officers
and ecclesiastics, their consumption of white bread and
wine made from imported grapes, for the native elite in
clear growth, corrupt and also engaged in smuggling.144
Since Puerto Rico had no penal code until 1879,145 personal interests and
political conveniences, rather than the nature of the alleged crime, deter-
mined whether the accused would receive a death sentence.146
Although executions were a common practice during the Spanish
Regime, native Puerto Ricans, who remained outside the circle of the
Spanish native elite, categorically rejected the imposition of the punish-
ment.147  Puerto Rican opposition to the death penalty continued after the
United States annexed Puerto Rico from Spain in 1898, at the close of
the Spanish-American War, and continued imposing the death penalty on
the island.148  In 1902, the United States replaced Puerto Rico’s Spanish-
derived Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes with a new code copied
from the amended Penal Code of California of 1873.149  Of the twenty-
eight executions that took place on the island in the twentieth century,
many of the condemned were young, black or mestizo farmworkers con-
victed of murder.150
143 See SUED-BADILLO, supra note 138, at 28–30.  For example, when five brothers from
a prominent family were accused of attempting to assassinate the governor and sentenced to
death, the governor commuted their sentence on the day of their execution after they had
already been brought out for execution in the main square. Id. at 30.  To get a sense of the
division between the native elite and the Puerto Rican poor, it may be helpful to note that a
1530 census conducted on the island showed that 327 white families owned 2,292 black slaves
and 473 native islanders. TR´IAS MONGE, supra note 137, at 5.
144 SUED-BADILLO, supra note 138, at 28 (translated from Spanish).
145 Id. at 57.
146 See id. at 49, 126.  For example, in 1541, there were fifteen murders in San Juan, but
only one of the alleged murderers was executed for his crime because the Spanish did not see
the need to aggressively prosecute crimes that only primarily affected the local population.
See id. at 24.
147 See id. at 26.
148 See C´ESAR J. AYALA & RAFAEL BERNABE, PUERTO RICO IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY:
A HISTORY SINCE 1898 314–15 (2007).
149 Eulalio A. Torres, The Puerto Rico Penal Code of 1902–1975: A Case Study of Ameri-
can Legal Imperialism, 45 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 18–20 (1976).
150 See Juan Alberto Soto Gonza´lez & Juan Carlos Rivera Rodrı´guez, La Pena de Muerte,
Una Batalla Entre una Ley Federal y la Constitucı´on de Puerto Rico, 41 REV. DER. P.R. 253,
257 (2002); SUED-BADILLO, supra note 138, at 87–89.  The use of the death penalty in Puerto
Rico at the beginning of the American Regime can be compared to the use of the death penalty
in the Old South, which was primarily aimed at subduing the black population rather than to
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The Puerto Rico Legislature attempted to abolish the death penalty
in 1917,151 but did not succeed until 1929,152 two years after the last
execution on the island.153  The consensus against the death penalty
among Puerto Rico’s native population was so strong that the penalty’s
prohibition continued even after presidentially appointed Puerto Rico
Governor Blanton Winship attempted to reinstate the death penalty be-
ginning in 1936, following series of deadly clashes between Puerto Rican
nationalists and police that made him fear the growing sense of national-
ism among the Puerto Rican people.154
Today, the application of Puerto Rican criminal statutes continues to
reflect the anti-death penalty sentiments embodied in the Constitution of
Puerto Rico.  For example, former Governor Luis Fortun˜o granted fed-
eral authorities jurisdiction over certain types of violent crimes, such as
carjackings and drive-by shootings, in 2012 in an effort to reduce the
serve legitimate goals of deterrence and communal retribution. See Stephen B. Bright, Dis-
crimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the
Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 439–42 (1995).  The similarity between the
imposition of the death penalty against blacks in the Old South and poor Puerto Ricans living
on the island is even more evident after considering that, during the early portion of the Ameri-
can regime, Puerto Ricans were considered to be black by their colonizers. FERNANDEZ, supra
note 131, at 13; see, e.g., Cartoon of Uncle Sam Teaching Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Ha-
waii, and Cuba, in Louis Dalrymple, School Begins (1899), available at http://www.loc.gov/
pictures/item/2012647459 (depicting Puerto Rico as a black child receiving a civilizations les-
son from his teacher, Uncle Sam).
151 SUED-BADILLO, supra note 138, at 58.
152 Id.
153 Abby Goodnough, Acquittal in Puerto Rico Averts Fight Over Government’s Right to
Seek Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/08/01/us/acquittal-puerto-rico-averts-fight-over-government-s-right-seek-death-
penalty.html.
154 See AYALA & BERNABE, supra note 148, at 136 (2007); TR´IAS MONGE, supra note
137, at 93–94.  The bloodiest of these clashes was the Ponce Massacre, which occurred on
March 21, 1937, Palm Sunday. STEPHEN HUNTER & JOHN BAINBRIDGE, JR., AMERICAN
GUNFIGHT: THE PLOT TO KILL TRUMAN—AND THE SHOOT-OUT THAT STOPPED IT 174–79
(2005).  Puerto Rican nationalists received a permit from the mayor of Ponce to hold a parade
commemorating the abolition of slavery in Puerto Rico and protesting the imprisonment of
Nationalist Party leader, Pedro Albizu Campos, who was accused of attempting to overthrow
the U.S. government. See TR´IAS MONGE, supra note 137, at 94.  Prior to the start of the
parade, Governor Winship instructed the police chief to revoke the nationalists’ permit and to
send 150 heavily armed police officers to the scene to maintain order. HUNTER & BAIN-
BRIDGE, JR., supra, at 175. Not to be deterred, the unarmed nationalists chose to march with-
out the permit. Id. at 175–76.  Soon thereafter, a shot rang out and, once the sound of the
submachine guns subsided, nineteen people, including women and children, lay dead in the
street and over a hundred more were wounded. Id. at 175–79. Governor Winship was blamed
as being responsible for the attack. TR´IAS MONGE, supra note 137, at 94.  In his report for the
American Civil Liberties Union, Arthur Garfield Hays stated that “facts show that the affair of
March 21st in Ponce was a massacre” and was caused by Governor Winship’s refusal to allow
Puerto Ricans to exercise their civil liberties to parade and assemble. FERNANDEZ, supra note
131, at 131. Although he was eventually removed from office, neither Governor Winship nor
any of the police officers involved in the attack were ever prosecuted. HUNTER & BAINBRIDGE,
JR., supra, at 179.
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prevalence of violent crime on the island.155  However, he also made it
clear that he remained opposed to the use of capital punishment in the
prosecution of those crimes.156  Likewise, many other politicians and
government officials also remain opposed to the imposition of the death
penalty in Puerto Rico despite the island’s role as a major illegal drug
transshipment point between South America and the United States.157
Thus, the application of the death penalty against Puerto Rican defend-
ants cannot be justified through the Puerto Rico Legislature’s grant of
jurisdiction to the U.S. federal government because applying the death
penalty in Puerto Rico directly contravenes Puerto Rico’s legislative in-
tent—to reduce crime without imposing the death penalty.
As demonstrated above, the prohibition of the death penalty in the
Constitution of Puerto Rico embodies a categorical communal rejection
of the death penalty that is still felt by the Puerto Rican people today.
Puerto Rico residents reject the death penalty, in large part, due to the
historical implications of the punishment.158  Unlike the death penalty in
the United States, which was collectively and voluntarily established by
the settlers and colonists as a means of attaining deterrence and commu-
nal retribution,159 the death penalty in Puerto Rico was solely imposed
under the Spanish and American colonial regimes as a means of protect-
ing colonial political and pecuniary interests and with complete disregard
for the native population.
The U.S. government continues to impose the death penalty in Pu-
erto Rico in a similar fashion today—as a thinly veiled attempt to further
its own agenda in the fight against terrorism and the War on Drugs.  For
example, on June 21, 2012, Texas Congressman Michael McCaul ad-
dressed the Committee of Homeland Security and noted, among other
statistics, that 80% of the cocaine trafficked through Puerto Rico is dis-
tributed on the East Coast.160  Although Congressman McCaul addressed
155 Coto, supra note 1; see also Annika McGinnis, Puerto Rico Governor Urges Federal R
Help in Drug War, MIAMI HERALD (June 21, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/21/
2861652/puerto-rico-governor-urges-federal.html.  The former Puerto Rico governor also en-
acted a new penal code, providing more severe punishments for violent offenses. Puerto Rico
Governor Luis Fortun˜o Signs New Penal Code into Effect, CARIBBEAN J. (July 30, 2012),
http://www.caribjournal.com/2012/07/30/puerto-rico-governor-luis-fortuno-signs-new-penal-
code-into-effect.
156 Puerto Rico Jury Rejects Death Penalty in Drug Dealer Case, REUTERS (Sept. 27,
2012, 6:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-puertorico-deathpenalty-
idUSBRE88Q1UU20120927.
157 Id.
158 See Saeed Shabazz, Activists Fighting Return of Death Penalty in Puerto Rico, FINAL
CALL (Apr. 20, 2005 2:53 PM), http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/article_1937.shtml.
159 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 5–16 (2002).
160 U.S.-Caribbean Border: Open Road for Drug Traffickers and Terrorists: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec., 112th Cong. 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter U.S.-Caribbean Border], available at http://
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the fact that millions of Puerto Ricans are currently “under siege” as a
result of the escalating violence on the island,161 which has a higher mur-
der rate than any state,162 his real concerns are summarized in the follow-
ing quote: “Because Puerto Rico is a US Territory, illegal contraband
that makes it to the island is unlikely to be subjected to further US Cus-
toms inspections en route to the continental United States, meaning it is
easily mailed or placed on commercial aircraft without suspicion.”163
This remark suggests that Congressman McCaul is far more concerned
with drugs entering the continental United States than the effects that the
drug trade is having on Puerto Rican residents.164
Just as the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia looked to the 1689
English Bill of Rights as the guide to determine the true, current meaning
of the Eighth Amendment, the prohibition of the death penalty in the
Constitution of Puerto Rico should be examined within the same type of
historical framework.165  Therefore, because Puerto Rico’s capital pun-
ishment prohibition was born out of a repressive colonial history and
continues to be imposed solely to serve the interest of the U.S. federal
government, the death penalty cannot pass constitutional muster under
the Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency test if imposed upon
defendants in Puerto Rico.166
C. Puerto Rico Jury Sentencing Data Demonstrates a Consensus
Opposed to the Death Penalty
Since the 1988 reinstatement of the federal death penalty, the U.S.
government has sought to impose the punishment against six defendants
in Puerto Rico, and in each case, the jury declined to impose it.167  While
it can be argued that these six cases provide insufficient jury sentencing
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg79507/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg79507.pdf (statement of
Rep. Michael McCaul, Chairman).
161 Id. at 2.
162 Gabe Gutierrez, The ‘Third Border’: Puerto Rico a Backdoor into US Mainland for
Drug Cartels, NBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2012, 7:20 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/
11/23/15392453-the-third-border-puerto-rico-a-backdoor-into-us-mainland-for-drug-cartels.
163 U.S.-Caribbean Border, supra note 160, at 3 (emphasis added).
164 See id.; see generally Gutierrez, supra note 162 (discussing the effect of the high
incidences of murder in Puerto Rico on the families of victims).
165 See 408 U.S. 238, 243–44 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
166 See Adam Liptak, Puerto Ricans Angry That U.S. Overrode Death Penalty Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2003, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/17/us/puerto-ri-
cans-angry-that-us-overrode-death-penalty-ban.html.
167 See Coto, supra note 1; Jury Declines to Impose Death Penalty in Puerto Rico R
Murders, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/24/us-usa-
deathpenalty-puertorico-idUSBRE92N02020130324 [hereinafter Candelario Santana Ver-
dict]; Puerto Rico Jury Deliberating Rare Death Penalty Case, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2012,
10:32 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-puertorico-deathpenalty-idUS-
BRE88Q11620120927; Reuters, Puerto Rican Jury Rejects Death Sentence in Police Killing,
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 13, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-04-12/news/sns-rt-us-usa-
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data to determine whether or not the Puerto Rico consensus is opposed to
the death penalty, a stronger argument can be made that the data indi-
cates a community consensus against the death penalty because these
cases constitute 100% of modern death penalty cases decided in Puerto
Rico and the juries in those cases refused to impose the death penalty
despite the objectively severe nature of the defendants’ crimes.  To date,
Puerto Rican juries have refused to impose the death penalty against de-
fendants convicted of murdering a guard during the robbery of an ar-
mored truck,168 acting as an accomplice to the murder of a Veteran’s
Administration Hospital guard during the course of a robbery,169 murder-
ing an ex-girlfriend who was a DEA informant,170 orchestrating and par-
ticipating in a shooting that killed eight people,171 and murdering an
undercover police officer during a drug deal.172  These verdicts represent
the will of the Puerto Rican people because the jurors at those trials
served as the “link between community values and the penal system.”173
verdict-puertoricobre93b0o5-20130412_1_death-sentence-death-penalty-puerto-ricans [herein-
after Casey Verdict].
168 Defendant Hernaldo Medina Villegas received a life sentence, despite the fact that he
was convicted of shooting the guard in the head while he was laying defenseless on the
ground.  Fed. Death Penalty Res. Counsel, Federal Capital Prosecutions Resulting in a Sen-
tence Less Than Death, CAPDEFNET.ORG (June 17, 2011), http://www.capdefnet.org/FDPRC/up
loadedFiles/Public/Case_Descriptions/Case_Descriptions_by_Category/Federal%20Capital%
20Prosecutions%20Resulting%20in%20a%20Sentence%20Less%20than%20Death%20-%20
6-17-11.pdf.  His accomplice, Lorenzo Catalan Roman, also received a life sentence. Id.
169 Carlos L. Ayala-Lopez received a life sentence. Id.
170 Burgos Montes received a life sentence.  Coto, supra note 1. R
171 Alexis Candelario Santana received a life sentence.  Candelario Santana Verdict,
supra note 167.
172 Lashaun Casey received a life sentence. Casey Verdict, supra note 167.
173 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957)).  Although not every jury delivered a unanimous life verdict, this fact
has no impact on the evolving standards of decency analysis.  For example, the Burgos Montes
jury did not reach a unanimous verdict.  Burns, supra note 20.  Rather, during the preliminary
vote, seven jurors favored the death penalty and five opposed it; in the final vote, eleven jurors
favored death and a single juror remained opposed.  Melissa Correa Vela´zquez, Mayorı´a
Querı´a Ejecutar a Edison Burgos, VOCERO (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.vocero.com/once-a-
favor-de-pena-de-muerte-en-caso-edison-burgos.  However, the fact that the jury did not de-
liver a unanimous life sentence should have no bearing on how the evolving standards of
decency analysis should be applied to Puerto Rico capital defendants because the Supreme
Court has only considered final jury verdicts when applying the evolving standards of decency
test. See generally supra Part I.B–C (detailing the objective indicia used by the Supreme
Court when conducting the evolving standards of decency analysis, such as jury verdicts).  In
addition, jury deliberation data should not be used while conducting an evolving standards of
decency analysis because it is unavailable in the majority of cases and, thus, cannot be consist-
ently used. See Thomas L. Brunell et al., Factors Affecting the Length of Time a Jury Deliber-
ates: Case Characteristics and Jury Composition, 5 REV. LAW & ECON. 555, 559 (2009) (“A
recurring challenge in jury deliberation analysis is the difficulty in obtaining data. Most of the
data on juries comes from experimental situations which by their very nature constrain the
length of time deliberations may take place.”).  Moreover, a lack of unanimous jury agreement
does not necessarily demonstrate that the national consensus is moving toward accepting the
death penalty because a jury’s lack of consensus can be explained by a myriad of alternative
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D. Additional Objective Indicia Confirm a Puerto Rican Consensus
Opposed to the Death Penalty
In addition to Puerto Rico legislative and jury sentencing data,
many other objective indicia demonstrate that the Puerto Rico consensus
is opposed to the imposition of the death penalty against Puerto Rican
defendants.174  Public opinion polls indicate that Puerto Rico residents
have remained opposed to the federal death penalty since before the pas-
sage of the FDPA.175  In addition to the general Puerto Rican population,
professional organizations, such as the Puerto Rico Bar Association176
and the Puerto Rico ACLU,177 also reject the death penalty.  For exam-
ple, when asked about his opinion regarding the death penalty in Puerto
Rico, Arturo Luis Da´vila Toro, the president of the Puerto Rico Bar As-
sociation, stated, “Although we are talking about some facts that are very
gruesome, the people of Puerto Rico do not approve in any way of capi-
tal punishment.”178  In addition, although the Supreme Court does not
always consider international opinion when determining whether a pun-
ishment is cruel and unusual,179 many Latin American countries have
either banned capital punishment altogether180 or severely limited its
application.181
factors. See, e.g., Joshua S. Press, Untruthful Jurors in the Federal Courts: Have We Become
Comfortably Numb?, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 253 (2009) (discussing how the voir dire process
currently used in the federal courts does not guarantee juror impartiality).  Therefore, in light
of these considerations, courts should not give weight to jury deliberation data while con-
ducting the evolving standards of decency analysis because doing so would only increase the
likelihood of inconsistent and prejudicial results. See supra Part I.C–D.
174 Shabazz, supra note 158.
175 See Liptak, supra note 166.
176 See id.
177 Death Penalty, ACLU OF P.R., http://www.aclu-pr.org/EN/WhatWeDo/DeathPenalty/
DeathPenalty.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2013).
178 Liptak, supra note 166.
179 But see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1976) (“‘[The] climate of international opinion concerning the accept-
ability of a particular punishment’ is an additional consideration which is ‘not irrelevant.’”)).
180 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 311 (3rd ed. 2002).  Although Mexico officially abolished the death penalty in 2005,
some Mexican citizens are now calling for its reinstatement to help curb violence. Mexico:
Death Penalty Gaining Support, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/14/mexico-death-penalty-gain_n_157868.html.  This type
of sentiment is not seen in Puerto Rico despite warnings that the island is becoming a “narco-
state.” See Elyssa Pachico, Is Puerto Rico Becoming a Narco-State?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR (Dec. 16, 2011, 11:33 AM), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-
Monitor/2011/1216/Is-Puerto-Rico-becoming-a-narco-state.
181 SCHABAS, supra note 180; see generally THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 2002) (noting that international law customa-
rily incorporates the basic norms of international law followed by countries due to a sense of
legal obligation, regardless of whether they are obligated to do so by treaty or domestic law).
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Even the families of victims of capital crimes reject the punish-
ment.182  In the case of the murder of Madelyn Semidey Morales,
Morales’s mother agreed with Edison Burgos Montes’s life sentence,
stating, “I’m satisfied that justice was served.”183  Morales’s father also
voiced his approval of the verdict by acknowledging that the jury “did
their job” and that “[t]he system worked.”184
CONCLUSION
In response to Edison Burgos Montes’s life sentence, U.S. Attorney
Rosa Emilia Rodriguez stated, “I think we will soon be ready for the
appropriate [death penalty] case.” 185  While it is possible that the mean-
ing of the term “we” in her statement refers to the Puerto Rican people, it
is far more appropriate to interpret the term “we” as applying to the fed-
eral government.  The U.S. government will likely continue to pursue
Puerto Rico death penalty cases in the hopes that a Puerto Rico jury will
finally impose a death sentence by virtue of sheer statistical probability.
In 2013, Puerto Rican juries decided two more death penalty cases.
The first case involved defendant Alexis Candelario Santana, a man ac-
cused of masterminding a 2009 shooting rampage in a bar that resulted in
eight fatalities.186  This case garnered significant attention because of the
brutality of the shootings and the fact that one of the victims was preg-
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(Dec. 5, 2012, 4:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/05/puerto-rico-murder-so-
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of publicist Jose´ Enrique Go´mez Saladı´n, who was beaten and burned alive in the town of
Cayey on November 30, 2012 during a robbery. Id.; Miguel Rivera Puig, Publicista Suplico´
por Su Vida, VOCERO (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.vocero.com/publicista-murio-a-golpes.  Fol-
lowing Go´mez Saladı´n’s death, activists launched a movement on Twitter called #Todos-
SomosJose´Enrique (“We Are All Jose´ Enrique”).  Ramos, supra.  The campaign, which
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awareness regarding the growing problem of violence in Puerto Rico. Id.  The important
takeaway from this movement is that, rather than demanding that the alleged perpetrators be
put to death, the Puerto Rican people are attempting to deter future violence by essentially
saying, We are all one people and we suffer through every act of violence together.  Despite
Puerto Rico’s continuing opposition to the death penalty, the U.S. Attorney’s Office spokes-
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Saladı´n’s murder may be subject to the death penalty. Feds Take Over Go´mez Saladı´n Case,
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nant.187  The second case involved defendant Lashaun Casey, a man ac-
cused of killing an undercover police officer during a drug deal.188
Puerto Rican juries declined to impose the death penalty in both cases
and instead sentenced both men to life in prison.189
No death penalty cases are currently slated to begin in Puerto Rico.
However, even if a future Puerto Rican death penalty case were to result
in a death sentence verdict, that sentence alone would be insufficient to
demonstrate that the Puerto Rican consensus has changed due to the
small number of death-certified cases that have been adjudicated in Pu-
erto Rico since the reintroduction of the death penalty and the fact that
Puerto Rican legislative data—the Constitution of Puerto Rico—is un-
equivocally opposed to the imposition of the death penalty in Puerto
Rico.
Future Puerto Rican death penalty cases will provide Puerto Rican
federal capital defendants with the opportunity to raise Eighth Amend-
ment claims arising under the evolving standards of decency test to argue
that the consensus of the Puerto Rican people is unwaveringly opposed
to the death penalty.  Ultimately, these claims will demonstrate that ei-
ther the federal death penalty is unconstitutional when applied to Puerto
Rican defendants or that the Supreme Court’s evolving standards of de-
cency test is invalid and unworkable.
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